Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Michael V. Wedin, Ian McFetridge and David E. Cooper

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28 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18487 We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
4568 If 'Queen of England' does not refer if there is no queen, its meaning can't refer if there is one [Cooper,DE]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18488 We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
4574 If some peoples do not have categories like time or cause, they can't be essential features of rationality [Cooper,DE]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
12354 A 'categorial' property is had by virtue of being or having an item from a category [Wedin]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
12358 Substance is a principle and a kind of cause [Wedin]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
12346 Form explains why some matter is of a certain kind, and that is explanatory bedrock [Wedin]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
4573 If it is claimed that language correlates with culture, we must be able to identify the two independently [Cooper,DE]
4575 A person's language doesn't prove their concepts, but how are concepts deduced apart from language? [Cooper,DE]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
4561 Many sentences set up dispositions which are irrelevant to the meanings of the sentences [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
4564 I can meaningfully speculate that humans may have experiences currently impossible for us [Cooper,DE]
4565 The verification principle itself seems neither analytic nor verifiable [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
4563 'How now brown cow?' is used for elocution, but this says nothing about its meaning [Cooper,DE]
4562 Most people know how to use the word "Amen", but they do not know what it means [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
4566 Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE]
4571 Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
4572 If predicates name things, that reduces every sentence to a mere list of names [Cooper,DE]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
4576 An analytic truth is one which becomes a logical truth when some synonyms have been replaced [Cooper,DE]